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INTRODUCTION
A great deal of criticism has been directed at the United States
patent system due to spiraling patent litigation costs and the
inconsistent quality of patents issued by the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (the “Patent Office”). 1 The judicially
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who is great with words.
1
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, executive summary 4–5 & ch. 5 at 24–25
(2003) [hereinafter FTC report], available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/10/
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created doctrine of inequitable conduct is one of the most highly
criticized areas of this patent system and an area recently targeted
for reform because its inherently subjective nature engenders
significant litigation costs and deters patent applicants from being
forthright and honest, thereby impacting patent quality. 2 While
scholars and practitioners alike have engaged in numerous
discussions about whether reforming the doctrine of inequitable
conduct would lower litigation costs and improve patent quality,
few have undertaken a statistical analysis to quantify the effect of
any such reform.
This Comment will discuss the evolution of the inequitable
conduct standard and will examine, using statistical analysis, the
policy considerations and consequences of reforming this standard
through legislation. Part I sets forth an explanation of how the
inequitable conduct standard developed and analyzes how courts
have been implementing this standard since its inception. Part II
investigates the allure of pleading even a meritless inequitable
conduct defense in an effort to avoid a finding of patent
infringement and presents a statistical analysis of how courts
adjudicate the defense. Part III reviews the current reform
proposals and the policy implications of these proposals. Part IV
examines the pending legislation designed to reform this standard
and discusses the effect such legislation would have on patent
litigation. Finally, the author endorses in the conclusion of the
Comment his view that reform lies not in modifying the
inequitable conduct standard but in modifying the procedural
paradigm in which such claims are brought.
I. BACKGROUND
Inequitable conduct is a defense a party accused of patent
infringement can raise during a patent litigation. 3 The defense is
invoked in litigation when there is evidence that a patent applicant
cpreport.htm; NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 47, 70
(Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter NAS study], available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10976.html.
2
NAS study, supra note 1, at 7, 121–23.
3
See 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.03 (MB 2008).
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breached a duty of candor and good faith to the Patent Office by
engaging in behavior such as misrepresenting information or
omitting information that might adversely impact the Patent
Office’s decision to grant a patent. 4 If a court determines
inequitable conduct occurred, the court can hold the patent
unenforceable, meaning that the patent holder cannot enforce the
patent rights on other parties even if the patent is valid and being
infringed by these other parties. 5
Whether inequitable conduct occurred is determined using
proof of materiality and intent shown by clear and convincing
evidence. 6 Materiality, in turn, is established by using one of a
number of judicially sanctioned tests, 7 each of which evaluates
whether affirmative misrepresentations or omissions of
information should be considered material. 8 In deciding whether
information is “material,” the courts typically utilize the
“reasonable examiner” test because it is the broadest test and the
one that most closely aligns with how business should be
conducted with the Patent Office. 9 This “reasonable examiner”
test examines whether “there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable examiner would consider it important in deciding
whether to allow the application to issue as a patent.” 10 In finding
materiality pursuant to this test, the court determines whether a
threshold level of materiality has been reached. 11 Though,
information that is merely cumulative to what was already taken
into account by the examiner is generally disregarded because it
does not raise a new issue beyond what the examiner previously
considered. 12
4

Id.
See Lummus Indus., Inc. v. D.M. & E. Corp., 862 F.2d 267, 274 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
6
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
7
Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
8
See Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
9
Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1315–16.
10
Id. at 1315 (citing PTO Rules of Practice in Patent Cases, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1977)).
11
Baxter Int’l, 149 F.3d at 1327.
12
See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1582
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing Halliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 925 F.2d 1435,
1440 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
5
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In addition to determining materiality, it is also the
responsibility of the court to determine whether the evidence
indicates that the patent applicant possessed a threshold level of
intent to deceive or mislead the Patent Office. 13 To make such a
finding of intent—a subjective determination of the state of mind
of the individual allegedly involved in the misconduct 14 —a court
must find that the conduct, when viewed in light of all the
evidence, including evidence of good faith, indicates sufficient
culpability to warrant a finding that the patent applicant intended to
deceive or mislead the Patent Office. 15 Intent to deceive does not,
however, need to be proven by direct evidence. 16 Clear and
convincing inferential evidence of the circumstances surrounding
the alleged conduct is sufficient to prove intent to deceive.17 In the
event the court finds that the threshold levels of materiality and
intent have been established, the court must then balance such
evidence. 18 If the information is highly material, this balancing
can result in a finding of inequitable conduct even when there is
not much evidence of intent. 19 Similarly, an inequitable conduct
finding may occur when information is not very material, if there
exists strong evidence of intent. 20
A. Court Involvement in the Standard of Inequitable Conduct
The doctrine of inequitable conduct arose from a series of
Supreme Court cases ending in 1945. 21 The series culminated with
13

Baxter Int’l, 149 F.3d at 1327.
NAS study, supra note 1, at 122.
15
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
16
Baxter Int’l, 149 F.3d at 1329; see also Hycor Corp. v. Schueter Co., 740 F.2d 1529,
1540 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
17
Baxter Int’l, 149 F.3d at 1329.
18
Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
19
NAS study, supra note 1.
20
Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
21
Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1315; see Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v Auto. Maint.
Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S.
238 (1944); see also Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 244
(1933) (providing the doctrine of unclean hands for equity matters that the Supreme
Court relies on in Precision, 324 U.S. at 819).
14
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Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive
Maintenance Machinery Co., 22 where the Supreme Court refused
to enforce patents tainted with fraud. 23 Fashioning an inequitable
conduct defense from the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, the
Precision Court stated that applicants “have an uncompromising
duty to report to [the Patent Office] all facts concerning possible
fraud or inequitableness underlying the applications in issue.” 24
However, the Precision Court did not articulate any specific test or
provide any guidance for future courts to help them determine
when inequitable conduct would be deemed to have occurred (and,
therefore, when a patent would be rendered unenforceable). 25
Following the Precision Court’s decision, the Patent Office created
Rule 56, which imposes a duty of candor and good faith on every
individual who is associated with the filing and prosecution of a
patent application. 26
Not surprisingly, the inequitable conduct doctrine continued to
develop through numerous court decisions following the Supreme
Court’s Precision pronouncement and the Patent Office’s
implementation of Rule 56. 27 As the doctrine evolved, different
courts fashioned different tests to determine what constituted
materiality, with some courts using an objective “but for” test,
other courts using a subjective “but for” test, and yet other courts
using a “but it may have” test. 28 Under the objective “but for” test,
information is material if it would preclude a patent from being
issued. 29 Courts apply this test by determining whether the
information involved in the alleged misconduct would invalidate
the patent if such information was considered. 30 The objective
22

Precision, 324 U.S. 806.
Id. at 819.
24
Id. at 818.
25
Id. at 819.
26
Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1315.
27
Cf. id.
28
Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
1984); see also Plastic Container Corp. v. Cont’l Plastics of Okla., Inc., 607 F.2d 885,
899 (10th Cir. 1984); Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 795–96 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re
Multidistrict Litig. Involving Frost Patent, 398 F. Supp. 1353, 1368 (D. Del. 1980).
29
Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1315; Gemveto Jewelry Co. v. Lambert Bros., Inc., 542
F. Supp. 933, 939–40 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
30
In re Frost Patent, 398 F. Supp. at 1368.
23
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“but for” test is exemplified by Walker Process Equipment v. Food
Machinery & Chemical Corp., 31 where the Supreme Court held a
patent invalid because the applicant withheld prior public use
information from the Patent Office. 32 The Court reasoned that
because prior public use is an absolute bar to patentability, the
patent would not have been issued “but for” this withholding of
information. 33
The subjective “but for” test focuses on whether the
misrepresentation of information actually caused the examiner to
approve a patent application that would not have otherwise been
approved. 34 In order to find inequitable conduct under the
subjective “but for” test, a court needs to consider the state of mind
of the actual examiner who issued the patent. 35 In this regard, as
the Sixth Circuit noted in American Cyanamid Co. v. Federal
Trade Commission, 36 the ultimate questions are: (1) did the
examiner receive all the information he requested; and (2) did the
examiner rely on misleading information to issue the patent. 37
This subjective “but for” test is contrasted with the objective “but
for” test, where the state of mind of the actual examiner is
irrelevant and a court determination of invalidity is used to
determine if information is material. 38
The third, the “but it may have” test, seeks to determine if the
misrepresentation or omission might have reasonably affected the
examiner’s decision on patentability during prosecution. 39 An
example of this test can be seen in SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of
America, 40 where a patent applicant conducted testing to
distinguish the invention from the prior art,41 and then filed an
31

Walker Process Equip. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
Id. at 174.
33
Id.
34
Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1315; Gemveto Jewelry, 542 F. Supp. at 939–40.
35
James Cronin, Comment, Inequitable Conduct and the Standard of Materiality, 50
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1327, 1340 (2006).
36
American Cyanamid Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966).
37
Id. at 778.
38
Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1315.
39
American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
1984); see also Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1315.
40
SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 318 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
41
Id. at 444.
32
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affidavit showing only the test results that supported the
application, omitting contradictory test results. 42 In determining
materiality, the SCM court focused on whether the withheld
information was relevant, and reasoned that any inequitable
conduct in the obtaining of a patent was enough to dissuade a court
from enforcing the patent against infringers. 43 Thus, rather than
look at the state of mind of the actual examiner, the court
determines if the misrepresentation or omission might affect any
examiner’s decision on patentability of the patent application. 44
In 1977, the Patent Office amended Rule 56 to clarify the duty
of candor and good faith. 45 The amended rule was expected to
stabilize court decisions and aid people applicants in complying
with the duty of candor and good faith. 46 This amended rule
required applicants to disclose “material” information in their
possession and went on to provide a definition of what information
would be deemed material 47 —a definition fashioned off of the
Supreme Court’s definition of materiality from a securities fraud
case. 48 Following the Patent Office’s amendment, the courts
embraced as an appropriate starting point Rule 56’s definition of
materiality, with the Federal Circuit noting “that the pertinent
inquiry is not whether a reasonable examiner would want to be
aware of a particular thing, but whether, after he was aware of it,
he would ‘consider it important’ in deciding whether to reject one
or more claims.” 49 While subsequent cases before the Federal
Circuit continued to discuss all four of the materiality tests, the
Rule 56 “reasonable examiner” test gradually became the sole test
invoked by the court. 50

42

Id. at 446.
Id. at 449.
44
Id. at 445.
45
Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
46
See Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 5588, 5588 (Jan. 28,
1977).
47
Id. at 5589–90.
48
See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
49
Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362 n.2 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
50
Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1316.
43
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In 1992, the Patent Office again amended Rule 56, 51 creating
“an arguably narrower standard of materiality.” 52 This 1992
amendment—still in place today—provides:
[I]nformation is material to patentability when it is
not cumulative to information already of record or
being made of record in the application, and
(1) It establishes, by itself or in combination with
other information, a prima facie case of
unpatentability of a claim; or
(2) It refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the
applicant takes in (i) Opposing an argument of
unpatentability relied on by the Office, or (ii)
Asserting an argument of patentability.
A prima facie case of unpatentability is established
when the information compels a conclusion that a
claim is unpatentable under the preponderance of
evidence, burden-of-proof standard, giving each
term in the claim its broadest reasonable
construction consistent with the specification, and
before any consideration is given to evidence which
may be submitted in an attempt to establish a
contrary conclusion of patentability. 53
Despite this 1992 amendment, it was not until 2006 that a court
considered how the amended definition would impact a judicial
determination of materiality, as the amendment by its terms
applied only to applications pending or filed after March 16,
1992. 54 Although a few post-1992 cases utilized the new Rule 56
definition, 55 the 2006 Federal Circuit case of Digital Control, Inc.
51

Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2021 (Jan. 17, 1992).
Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1314.
53
PTO Rules of Practice in Patent Cases, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2008).
54
Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2021 (Jan. 17, 1992); see also Digital
Control, 437 F.3d at 1316 (deciding that the court did not have to follow the 1992 rule
change); Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1363–64 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
55
See Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 204 F.3d 1368, 1374
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (applying the new rule to a patent issuing on an application filed after
1992 without any discussion of whether the old standard should apply); Molins PLC v.
52
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v. Charles Machine Works 56 was the first case to pronounce how
the 1992 amendment would affect judicial decisions adjudging
materiality. 57 In Digital Control, a three judge panel, which
included the Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, decided to
continue using the 1977 “reasonable examiner” test, even though
the materiality definition that supported the test no longer existed
and had been superseded by the 1992 definition. 58 In supporting
its decision, the court reasoned that the “reasonable examiner”
definition in Rule 56 became the dominant materiality test
invoked; it did not supplant or replace the case law precedent but
rather provided another test of materiality. 59 Such rationale was
surprising considering earlier judicial pronouncements indicating
the court’s willingness to adhere to the definitions set forth by the
Patent Office. 60
Other than as set forth above, neither the Digital Control
decision nor subsequent Federal Circuit decisions explained why it
chose to ignore the materiality definition set forth in the 1992
amendment and continue using the 1977 Rule 56 standard instead,
a break from the Federal Circuit’s long tradition of deferring to the
rules and regulations promulgated by the Patent Office. Such a
break from tradition is particularly surprising considering the fact
that the Patent Office amended Rule 56 “to present a clearer and
more objective definition of what information the Office considers
material to patentability,” 61 suggesting that the Patent Office
wanted to alter how the courts determined materiality. Perhaps the
decision to ignore the 1992 amendment was a reaction to the 2005
patent reform bill pending in the House of Representatives, which
would have severely restricted the materiality standard. 62 After all,
several months prior to the Digital Control decision, Judge Pauline

Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1179 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (observing that administrative
rules are not retroactive, but that the case arose before the rule change, so the issue need
not be addressed).
56
Digital Control, 437 F.3d 1309.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 1316.
59
Id.
60
Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1328 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
61
Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2024 (Jan. 17, 1992).
62
See H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
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Newman of the Federal Circuit called for Congress and industry to
broadly examine the impact of the proposed reforms and
understand the issues involved before moving forward with the
legislation. 63
Alongside the debate over how materiality should be defined,
beginning in 2003 the Federal Circuit began relaxing the intent
standard. 64 In 1988, the Federal Circuit held in an en banc
decision in Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister,
Inc. 65 that more than “gross negligence” must exist to justify a
finding of intent to deceive. 66 Kingsdown marked a shift in the
requirements for making a finding of inequitable conduct, where
prior to the Kingsdown decision the Court was becoming
increasingly concerned with how frequently inequitable conduct
was being raised. 67 By rejecting the notion that intent could be
inferred from an unknowing negligent act, the Kingsdown decision
implied a certain level of knowledge was needed to prove intent to
deceive, which was developed by subsequent decisions. 68
Historically the courts have allowed intent to be inferred from the
facts and circumstances of the case due to the difficulty of proving
an individual knowingly deceived the Patent Office. 69 To infer
intent requires that the applicant knew of the information, the
applicant knew or should have known of the materiality of the
information, and the applicant has not provided a credible
explanation for withholding or misrepresenting the information. 70
A “should-have-known” standard was developed to address

63

Marius Meland, Federal Judges Urge Caution on Patent Reform, IP LAW 360, June
13, 2005, available at http://www.law360.com/registrations/user_registration?
article_id=3559.
64
James E. Hanft & Stacey S. Kerns, The Return of the Inequitable Conduct Plague,
19 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 1, 2 (2007). See generally Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v.
Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
65
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
66
Id. at 876.
67
Cf. id.; supra text accompanying note 23 (discussing Precision Instrument
Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., in which the Supreme
Court refused to enforce patents tainted with fraud).
68
See Hanft & Kerns, supra note 64, at 1.
69
Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs., Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1354
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
70
Nordberg, Inc. v. Telsmith, Inc., 82 F.3d 394, 397 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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situations when there is a disregard for warnings that material
information existed or there is cultivation of ignorance to avoid
actual knowledge. 71 If there is no actual knowledge and no
warnings about the existence of material information, no intent to
deceive can be found. 72 However, the Federal Circuit panel
decisions have altered the knowledge requirement in the “shouldhave-known” standard and replaced the need for evidence with a
positive inference of wrongdoing. 73
In the 2005 case Novo Nordisk Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. BioTechnology General Corp., 74 the Federal Circuit found inequitable
conduct occurred when the inventor had no actual knowledge of
the materiality of the information and had no warnings about the
materiality of the information. 75
There, a Dutch inventor
inadvertently wrote the final step of a process partially in the past
tense, insinuating that he completed the step when, in fact, he had
not. 76 Although there existed no evidence that the Dutch inventor
or the prosecuting attorneys ever knew or suspected that there was
a mistake in how the patent application was drafted, 77 the Court
inferred intent, reasoning that the inventor was aware the final step
had not been completed and charging the inventor with
“knowledge of the law,” even though the Manual of Patent
Examination Procedures (“MPEP”) is not law. 78 The court
therefore used knowledge of law to impute that the inventor should
have known of the materiality of the misrepresentation to find
intent, in contrast to earlier precedent, which held no intent could
be found where no knowledge or warnings about the materiality
existed. 79

71

FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus. Inc., 836 F.2d 521, 526 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Nordberg, 82 F.3d at 397.
73
Ferring v. Barr, 437 F.3d 1181, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
74
Novo Nordisk Pharm., Inc. v. Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp., 424 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
75
Id. at 1361.
76
Id. at 1360–61.
77
Id. at 1361.
78
Id. The MPEP rules suggest that use of the past tense should be avoided. MPEP §
608.01(p)(II)(2007); see also Novo Nordisk Pharm., 424 F.3d at 1361.
79
See Nordberg, Inc. v. Telsmith, Inc., 82 F.3d 394, 397 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
72
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The Federal Circuit employed similar logic a couple of months
later in Ferring v. Barr. 80 In that case, Ferring’s patent application
was rejected because of a prior art reference, but the rejection
hinged on the determination of the word used in the prior art
reference, and the inventors sought declarations to prove the
meaning of this term was different. 81 Although the Ferring
inventors knew of the connections between the declarants and the
patent applicant, and that the patent examiner had asked for noninventor affidavits, he failed to notify the patent examiner that four
of the five declarations came from scientists that had been
employed or received funding from Ferring. 82 In so doing, the
court found intent to deceive, as Ferring “should have known” that
omitting the connections between declarants and the patent
applicant was material. 83 The problem with such rationale,
however, is that the court had previously held that an individual
cannot intend to deceive if there is no actual knowledge of the
materiality of the omitted information, 84 and there was no evidence
here that the Ferring inventors knew or avoided warnings that the
connections were material.
The erosion of the intent standard continued with Purdue
Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. 85 Here, Purdue’s
failure to disclose to the Patent Office that a “surprising discovery”
regarding dosage range formulation was based on insight rather
than experimental data, and the trial court found this to be highly
material and inferred intent from this high materiality. 86 The
Federal Circuit held that “[i]n a case such as this, when the
materiality of the undisclosed information is relatively low, there is
less basis for inferring intent from materiality alone.” 87 Such
rationale implied that if the court were to determine that
information is moderately or highly material, intent could be

80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

Ferring v. Barr, 437 F.3d 1181 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1183–84.
Id. at 1184.
Id. at 1191–92.
FMC Corp. v. Manitowac Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharm. Inc., 438 F.3d 1123 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1134–35.
Id.
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inferred based on materiality alone. 88 This erosion continued with
Kao Corp. v. Unilever U.S., Inc., 89 in which the trial court found
materiality but no intent to deceive. 90 In that case, inventors
initially disclosed only some results to the examiner, presenting the
previously omitted data a year later.91 Holding the omitted
information material but finding no attempt to conceal the
information, the trial court refrained from making a finding of
intent to deceive. 92 Although on appeal the Federal Circuit stated
that it may have weighed the evidence differently given a blank
slate, the court refused to second guess the district court’s
decision, 93 suggesting that it might well have affirmed a finding of
inequitable conduct if the case had been decided differently.
While Kingsdown has not been explicitly overruled, 94 the post2003 cases relaxing the intent standard indicate—especially when
viewed alongside the Federal Circuit’s decision to maintain the
“reasonable examiner” test 95 —the Federal Circuit’s attempt to
expand the scope of the inequitable conduct doctrine. Such
expansion lies in sharp contrast to the limiting reform called for by
the Patent Office and Legislature.
II. ANALYSIS OF INEQUITABLE CONDUCT ADJUDICATIONS
As briefly discussed earlier in this Comment, the advantages of
raising the inequitable conduct defense can lead to an overpleading of the defense. 96 When an alleged patent infringer
invokes the inequitable conduct defense, he stands the chance of
having the patent rendered unenforceable against him, 97 even if he

88

See Hanft & Kerns, supra note 64, at 4.
Kao Corp. v. Unilever U.S., Inc., 441 F.3d 963 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
90
Id. at 972.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
95
See Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1316; supra text accompanying note 50.
96
See John F. Lynch, An Argument For Eliminating The Defense of Patent
Unenforceability Based on Inequitable Conduct, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 7, 8 (1988).
97
See NAS study, supra note 1, at 121.
89
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in fact infringed the patent. 98 Perhaps almost as important,
pleading inequitable conduct puts the patentee on the defensive
and permits the alleged infringer to scrutinize the motives and
conduct of the patent applicant, even providing him with access to
documents protected by the attorney-client and work product
privileges. 99 Although inequitable conduct typically needs to be
pled with particularity, 100 often the accused infringer can seize
upon inconsistencies uncovered through discovery in the produced
documents to develop an adequate pleading. 101
Due to the ease of pleading the inequitable defense doctrine
and the strong advantages of doing so, it is important to
quantitatively understand the role inequitable conduct plays in
patent litigation. While it is difficult to quantify the number of
times inequitable conduct is pled or how much discovery into
inequitable conduct is permitted and completed, examining how
patent disputes are ultimately adjudicated provides some insight
into how the inequitable conduct defense is litigated and the extent
to which pleading inequitable conduct affects the outcome of a
case.
Table 1 below sets forth the total number of reported patent
decisions between 2000 and 2007, alongside a breakdown of how
many of these decisions involved inequitable conduct
determinations. 102
98
See CHISUM, supra note 3, § 19.03[5][d] (“[A] patent may be valid and yet be
rendered unenforceable for misuse or inequitable conduct. Similarly, a valid patent may
be (in the abstract) infringed . . . but there will be no liability to the patentee when the
patent is unenforceable.” (quoting Gardco Mfg., Inc. v. Herst Lighting Co., 820 F.2d
1209, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
99
Lynch, supra note 96, at 8.
100
See CHISUM, supra note 3, § 19.03[6][b][ii].
101
See Lynch, supra note 96, at 15–16.
102
See Kevin Mack, Note, Reforming Inequitable Conduct to Improve Patent Quality:
Cleansing Unclean Hands, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 155 tbl.1 (2006) (citing
University of Houston Law Center, U.S. Patent Litigation Statistics,
http://www.patstats.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2006) (providing statistical analysis of patent
cases involving inequitable conduct from the years 2000–05)); University of Houston
Law
Center,
U.S.
Patent
Litigation
Statistics,
Cumulative
Caselist,
http://www.patstats.org/Cumulative_Caselist_thru_2Q08.xls (last visited Oct. 7, 2008)
[hereinafter Caselist] (listing the patent cases decided from 2005 through the second
quarter of 2008); University of Houston Law Center, U.S. Patent Litigation Statistics,
Decisions for 2007, http://www.patstats.org/2007%20full%20year.htm (last visited Oct.

VOL19_BOOK2_BROWN

2009]

2/18/2009 3:16:08 AM

INEQUITABLE CONDUCT: A STANDARD IN MOTION

607

Table 1: Statistics Regarding Inequitable Conduct from
2000–07 103
Year

Number
of
Reported
Patent
Cases

Total
Number of
Times
Inequitable
Conduct was
Addressed
by the
104
Court

Number of
Times
Patentee
Prevailed
(No
Inequitable
Conduct
Found)

Number of
Times
Alleged
Infringer
Prevailed
(Inequitable
Conduct
Found)

Percentage of
Reported
Patent Cases
in which the
Court Ruled
Upon an
Inequitable
Conduct
105
Defense

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

104
161
234
208
127
248
359
439

20
27
37
40
44
46
49 (43)
95 (65)

15
23
26
22
29
33
37 (32)
55 (45)

5
4
11
18
15
13
12 (11)
40 (20)

19
17
16
19
35
19
14 (12)
22 (15)

7, 2008) [hereinafter 2007 Decisions] (detailing the decisions on patent cases for the year
2007); University of Houston Law Center, U.S. Patent Litigation Statistics, Decisions for
2006, http://www.patstats.org/2006.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2008) [hereinafter 2006
Decisions] (detailing the decisions on patent cases for the year 2006). The tables were
compiled with the raw data provided by the University of Houston Law Center in
addition to the data provided in Mack, supra.
103
The numbers not in parentheses represent court decisions on inequitable conduct on
a patent by patent basis, e.g., if a reported decision included two patents and the court
decided inequitable conduct with respect to each patent this would be counted as two in
the chart even though it is only in one case. The numbers in parentheses represent the
number of cases decided, irrespective of the number of patents upon which the court
rendered a decision.
104
For each year, this figure is calculated by adding the number of times the patentee
prevailed and the number of times the alleged infringer prevailed.
105
For each year, this figure is calculated by dividing the total number of times
inequitable conduct was addressed by the court by the number of reported patent cases.
The percentage is rounded to the nearest whole number.
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The above table shows that, between 2000 and 2007, courts
addressed, on average, inequitable conduct in less than 20% of all
reported patent cases. 106 This figure must be qualified, however,
because it is almost impossible to ascertain the number of times
inequitable conduct was pled, given that approximately 86% of
patent cases settle 107 and are therefore not captured in these
statistics. Interestingly, during 2006 and 2007, inequitable conduct
was being addressed by the Court less frequently than the average
for the time period of Table 1—in only 108 out of 798 cases—a
mere 14% of the time. 108
It is equally important to observe that during the eight-year
period reflected in Table 1, the alleged infringer prevailed against
the patentee approximately one-third of the time with the court
finding inequitable conduct was committed by the patentee. 109
When looking at the years 2006 to 2007, inequitable conduct was
found in about 4% of all patent cases litigated—31 times out of
798 cases. 110 While this figure does not take into account the
number of times the defense was raised, it seems to indicate that
there is not some massive failure of the system to reign in

106

See Mack, supra note 102, at 156; Caselist, supra note 102; 2007 Decisions, supra
note 102; 2006 Decisions, supra note 102.
107
See University of Houston Law Center, U.S. Patent Litigation Statistics, Patent Case
Dispositions, 2005 to 2007, http://www.patstats.org/2005-2007_FY_PATENT_CASE_
DISPOSITIONS_(corrected).doc (last visited Oct. 7, 2008) (detailing patent case
dispositions for the fiscal years 2005–07).
108
See Caselist, supra note 102; 2007 Decisions, supra note 102; 2006 Decisions,
supra note 102. The number 798 was obtained by totaling the number of cases reported
from the second column and the number 108 was obtained by adding 43 and 65 from the
third column. The numbers in parenthesis were used because they represent the number
of cases rather than a determination on a per patent basis. Each percentage is rounded to
the nearest whole number.
109
During the years 2000 to 2007, out of the 358 times the Court ruled on inequitable
conduct, the Court found there to be inequitable conduct by the patentee 118 times, or
33% of the time. See Mack, supra note 102, at 156; Caselist, supra note 102; 2007
Decisions, supra note 102; 2006 Decisions, supra note 102.
110
This figure was calculated by dividing the number of times the alleged infringer
prevailed (from column 5) over the number of reported patent cases (from column 2) for
the years 2006 and 2007. The percentage is rounded to the nearest whole number. See
Caselist, supra note 102; 2007 Decisions, supra note 102; 2006 Decisions, supra note
102.
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misconduct and that there are a relatively small number of patents
acquired through improper means. 111
Using the same data source as Table 1, Table 2 below breaks
down how the courts have treated inequitable conduct cases
between 2000 and 2006. 112
Table 2: Breakdown of Decisions on Inequitable Conduct from
2000–06 113

Appellate
Affirmances
Appellate
Reversals
Total Appellate
Decisions 115

Patentee
Prevails

Alleged
Infringer
Prevails

57

23

% of Time
Alleged
Infringer
Prevails 114
29

14

3

18

71

26

27

111
It is difficult to say the actual number of “bad patents” that applicants have
committed inequitable conduct during the procurement of the patent because only about
2% of patents are litigated, however it provides insight into the overall success rate of the
inequitable conduct defense and the number of patents that are potentially acquired
through improper means.
112
The data for 2007 is now available. See 2007 Decisions, supra note 102. According
to the 2007 data, the trial court, when ruling after a trial, found inequitable conduct 31%
of the time, while the Federal Circuit, ruling on appeal, found inequitable conduct 75% of
the time. Id. The percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number.
113
See 2006 Decisions, supra note 102; University of Houston Law Center, U.S. Patent
Litigation Statistics, Decisions for 2005, http://www.patstats.org/2005rev2.htm (last
visited Oct. 7, 2008) [hereinafter 2005 Decisions] (detailing the decisions on patent cases
for the year 2005); University of Houston Law Center, U.S. Patent Litigation Statistics,
Decisions for 2000–04, http://www.patstats.org/2000-04.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2008)
[hereinafter 2000–04 Decisions] (detailing the decisions on patent cases for the years
2000 to 2004).
114
For each category, this figure is calculated by dividing the number of times the
alleged infringer prevails into the total number of decisions for each category, the sum of
the number of times the alleged infringer prevails and the number of times the patentee
prevails.
115
For each category, this figure is the sum of appellate affirmances and appellate
reversals.
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Trial Court
Rulings After
Trial
Trial Court
Summary
Judgment

64

37

37

50

15

23

[Vol. 19:593

It is interesting to note that during the aforementioned seven
years, the Federal Circuit found inequitable conduct 27% of the
time while the trial court, when ruling after a trial, found
inequitable conduct 37% of the time. 116 Such variance indicates
that although the Federal Circuit has tended—particularly
recently 117 —to use a broader standard of inequitable conduct than
that proposed by the Patent Office and Legislature, it is still less
willing than are the trial courts to find inequitable conduct and is
not hesitant to reverse lower court findings of inequitable conduct,
which it has done 82% of the time. 118 What remains to be seen is
whether—and the degree to which—the Federal Circuit’s recent
trend of broadening the inequitable conduct standard will affect
future decisions and the percentage of inequitable conduct findings
it overrules.
The statistics set forth in Table 2 also provide some insight into
the number of times alleged patent infringers made meritless
claims of inequitable conduct. For a patentee to prevail on a
summary judgment motion, a court would need to find that the
patentee did not—as a matter of law—commit inequitable
conduct. 119 As indicated in Table 2 above, the courts made such a
116
See 2006 Decisions, supra note 102; 2005 Decisions, supra note 113; 2000–04
Decisions, supra note 113.
117
See supra text accompanying notes 64–93.
118
See 2006 Decisions, supra note 102; 2005 Decisions, supra note 113; 2000–04
Decisions, supra note 113. The 2007 data is not dispositive on the subject, as only one
decision was reversed by the Federal Circuit on appeal. However, that one reversal was
in favor of the alleged infringer. See 2007 Decisions, supra note 102.
119
See CHISUM, supra note 3, § 19.03[5][c] n.13 (citing Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v.
KLM Labs., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“While our precedent urges
caution in the grant of summary judgment respecting a defense of inequitable conduct,
summary judgment is not foreclosed. . . . [W]e must decide whether the evidence
respecting culpable intent makes the fact reasonably inferable either way, or whether the
evidence is so one-sided that the factual issue of intent may be decided as a matter of
law.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (“The judgment sought should be rendered if the
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finding 77% of the time. 120 While this high figure appears to
suggest an over-pleading of the inequitable conduct defense, the
figure must be considered in the context of all adjudications
because in a high percentage of cases the court does not decide the
issue of inequitable conduct on summary judgment. When
accounting for all court decisions during this period, only 19% (or
one in five) inequitable conduct pleadings appear to be meritless,
i.e., they were thrown out on summary judgment. 121 This lower
figure, though certainly indicating a prevalence of meritless claims
of inequitable conduct, does not indicate an epidemic of overpleading the defense.
The conundrum with eliminating the inequitable conduct
standard (or moving to a “but for” standard) is that not all cases
described had both validity and inequitable conduct
determinations. In fact, during 2006–07, courts made both
inequitable conduct and validity determinations in only 45% of
cases where the court found inequitable conduct. 122 Given the
complexities of litigation, it is difficult to surmise why no validity
determination was made in the remaining 55% of cases where
inequitable conduct was found. What is clear, however, is that
some percentage of those 55% of cases had a valid inequitable
conduct defense, but not a strong enough invalidity defense to
merit adjudication on the issue.
This means that more
pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”); Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d
1309, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“In order to prevail at the summary judgment stage, the
moving party must show that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that no
reasonable jury could find against the moving party.”).
120
This figure is obtained by taking the number of times the patentee prevailed on
summary judgment (50) divided by the number of summary judgment decisions by the
Court (65). See 2006 Decisions, supra note 102; 2005 Decisions, supra note 113; 2000–
04 Decisions, supra note 113.
121
This figure is obtained by taking the number of times the patentee prevailed on
summary judgment (50) divided by the total number of appellate decisions (71+26), the
total trial court decisions (64+37), and the total number of summary judgment decisions
by the Court (50+15). See 2006 Decisions, supra note 102; 2005 Decisions, supra note
113; 2000–04 Decisions, supra note 113.
122
This percentage is calculated by dividing the total number of cases where
inequitable conduct was found (31) by the number of cases where the court found both
inequitable conduct and the patent in question to be invalid (14). See infra Table 3.
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questionable—and perhaps even reprehensible—actions would go
unpunished if invalid claims were a prerequisite to pleading
inequitable conduct because the court never reaches the inequitable
conduct defense since the claims are determined to be valid despite
the patentee’s actions.
Table 3 below sets forth court decisions where both inequitable
conduct and validity were ruled upon for the 2006–07 period.
Table 3: Findings of Inequitable Conduct versus Validity
Findings 2006–07 123

Inequitable conduct
found
No Inequitable
conduct found

Patent Found
Valid
0

Patent Found
Invalid
14

Total
Cases
31

32

10

77

This table is significant because one of the proposed reforms to
the inequitable conduct standard is to make it a strict “but for”
standard, meaning that inequitable conduct is only considered if
one or more claims are found invalid. 124 By analyzing Court
decisions where both invalidity and inequitable conduct were ruled
upon, the impact of this type of standard can be understood. The
first row of Table 3 shows that a patent was never found valid
when inequitable conduct was deemed to have occurred. This
demonstrates a high correlation between a finding of claim
invalidity and inequitable conduct. Since the patent has wholly or
partially been found invalid already, the “but for” standard may not
translate into much punishment for the patentee, except if
remaining valid claims are held unenforceable. This high
correlation between invalidity and inequitable conduct provides
some credence to eliminating the inequitable conduct defense all
123

See 2007 Decisions, supra note 102; 2006 Decisions, supra note 102.
This “but for” standard is similar to the judicial “but for” test described above. See
supra text accompanying notes 27–33.
124
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together, since if the patentee committed inequitable conduct, then
the patent is probably invalid.
An examination of another data source compiled from 244
federal district court opinions involving inequitable conduct
between 1995 and 2004 125 largely confirms the statistical results
presented above. Of the 244 court opinions, 119 (approximately
half) were summary judgment decisions. 126 Of these, the court
declined approximately 50% of the time to grant summary
judgment motions, finding that the allegations warranted a trial.127
In the remaining 50% of the summary judgment motions the court
ruled on the issue finding inequitable conduct in ten cases and no
inequitable conduct in 50 cases (42% of the 119 summary
judgment decisions). 128 In other words, between 1995 and 2004,
42% of all summary judgment motions alleging inequitable
conduct appear to be the result of an over-pleading of the defense
because there were no factual questions and the law did not
support a finding of inequitable conduct. When those cases
rejecting summary judgment are removed from the analysis, the
1995 to 2004 sample shows that 83% of summary judgment
motions found no inequitable conduct, compared to 76% of the
summary judgment motions between 2000 and 2006 discussed
above. 129
In total, between 1995 and 2004, inequitable conduct was
found 30% of the time (in 37 out of 125 cases). 130 When
compared with the trial court decisions in Table 3 above in which

125

Katherine Nolan-Stevaux, Note, Inequitable Conduct Claims in the 21st Century:
Combating the Plague, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 160–61 (2005) (using the search
terms “patent & ‘inequitable conduct’” in the Westlaw database of federal IP district
court cases and excluding preliminary injunction motions).
126
Id. at 161.
127
Id. at 161 tbl.1.
128
Id.
129
Even more interesting is that 50 out of 244 district court decisions were seemingly
without merit (about 20%). See id. This aligns with the data presented in supra Table 2,
where 50 out of 263 decisions fell in the same category. See supra text accompanying
note 120. While this is not a statistically significant comparison, it does show
consistency in the numbers.
130
Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 125, at 162.
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inequitable conduct was found 37% of the time, 131 it becomes clear
that for over fourteen years, the trend of such cases is in favor of
finding no inequitable conduct occurred.
Table 4 below sets forth court decisions where both inequitable
conduct and validity were ruled upon between 1995 and 2004. 132
Table 4: District Court Findings of Inequitable Conduct versus
Validity 1995–2004 133

Inequitable Conduct
Found
No Inequitable
Conduct Found

Patent Found Patent Found
Valid
Invalid
2
16

Total
Cases
47

56

138

18

Interestingly, the data of Table 4 supports the same two
observations drawn from the data of Table 3 above. First,
patentees that commit inequitable conduct typically have patents
that are invalid when the court decides both issues, and second,
over half the time the court does not decide both inequitable
conduct and validity of a patent. The first observation supports the
conclusion that entirely eliminating inequitable conduct may not
change who is punished any more than using a “but for” standard
because a patentee that commits inequitable conduct usually has
invalid patent claims. The second observation supports the
conclusion that requiring invalid claims to plead inequitable
131

Again this is not statistically significant because the 1995 to 2004 data set did not
consider later determinations by higher courts, while the 2000 to 2006 data set did
consider appellate decisions.
132
Id. at 163. The data set presented in supra Table 4 is comparable to the data
presented in supra Table 3. However, supra Table 4 represents a ten year period rather
than a two year period, and it also considers only a sampling of district court opinions for
that particular ten year timeframe.
133
See Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 125, at 125–63. Note the difference in totals
between supra Table 4 and the 244 total cases Nolan-Stevaux considered is due to the
fact that the courts declined to grant summary judgment in a portion of the cases and so
no decision was made. See Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 125, at 161–63.
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conduct may severely restrict the number of times inequitable
conduct is found by the court. 134 This is shown in Table 4 by the
courts only deciding about 38% of the time to determine validity
when a finding of inequitable conduct occurred. 135 In rationalizing
these two observations, it is important to consider that although
those that commit inequitable conduct typically also have invalid
claims, this conclusion might not hold true if the courts considered
invalidity in all cases where inequitable conduct was found to
occur.
While the above data seems to indicate that inequitable conduct
is plead more often than needed, it does not appear to be a
“plague” 136 or “appearing in nearly every patent suit” 137 as was
previously thought. It is possible that relaxing the intent element
of the inequitable conduct standard could provide a greater
incentive to raise the defense more often, but it is extremely
difficult to know how the courts would react. Currently, the
Federal Circuit is more likely to reverse or find no inequitable
conduct despite the anecdotal evidence suggesting otherwise. The
statistical data also confirms that a policy determination needs to
be made about what kind of behaviors should be discouraged and
the practical costs of litigating such a standard.
III. POLICY RATIONALES FOR REFORMING THE INEQUITABLE
CONDUCT STANDARD
Calls to reform the inequitable conduct standard were
spearheaded by reports from the Federal Trade Commission (the
“FTC”) in 2003 and the National Academy of Sciences (the
“NAS”) in 2004. 138 The FTC report suggested that applicants
submit statements of relevance regarding their prior art references
to point the patent examiners to the best pieces of prior art, though

134

See Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 125, at 163.
This figure is obtained by dividing the number of times a validity determination was
made (18) by the total of cases where inequitable conduct was found (47). See supra
Table 4.
136
Burlington Indus. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
137
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
138
FTC report, supra note 1; NAS study, supra note 1.
135
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the report simultaneously acknowledged its concern that such a
requirement might create “dubious allegations” of inequitable
conduct because it could lead to accusations of misrepresenting the
importance of pieces of prior art. 139
The NAS report
recommended eliminating the inequitable conduct doctrine or, at
the very least, making legislative changes to its implementation. 140
Such suggested changes included not inferring intent from
materiality of information, providing de novo review of inequitable
conduct charges on appeal, awarding attorney’s fees to a prevailing
patentee, and/or referring misconduct to the Patent Office for reexamination and disciplinary action. 141
While the NAS
recommendations appear drastic, the report deemed such sweeping
changes necessary, as the NAS found the subjective nature of
inequitable conduct to be among the chief factors increasing the
cost of litigation and decreasing the predictability of patent
infringement litigation. 142
In addition to the FTC and NAS reports, the House of
Representatives and the Senate held hearings on the topic of patent
reform. 143 The hearings garnered speakers and submissions from a
diverse and knowledgeable field. This Article have analyzes
below portions of these hearings 144 to illustrate some of the main
positions and policy rationales taken by various constituents
regarding inequitable conduct.
The Intellectual Property Owners Association (the “IPO”) took
a position contrary to the NAS report, questioning whether any

139

See FTC report, supra note 1, at 12–13.
See NAS study, supra note 1, at 123.
141
Id.
142
See NAS study, supra note 1, at 117.
143
See Patent Reform: The Future of American Innovation: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Senate Hearings], available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings; Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R.
2795 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Amendment]; Committee Print
Regarding Patent Quality Improvement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005)
[hereinafter Committee Print Hearings].
144
See infra text accompanying notes 145–69.
140
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legislative reforms were necessary. 145 The IPO did not support
any legislative changes that would narrow the inequitable conduct
standard or reduce the amount of prior art submitted to the Patent
Office, but was instead interested only in legislation that would
make patent applicants more comfortable submitting to the Patent
Office explanations and opinions regarding prior art, thereby
increasing the quality of patents issued by the Patent Office. 146
The Business Software Alliance (“BSA”) also expressed concern
with any changes that would increase the threshold for a finding of
inequitable conduct, as a patent applicant’s incentive to be open
and honest with the Patent Office would be undermined if bad acts
were not being punished in litigation. 147 The BSA therefore
suggested that patent litigation cases be bifurcated and inequitable
conduct not be adjudicated until after liability for infringement had
been ruled upon, 148 since additional litigation may be avoided if
the alleged infringer prevailed on other counts (such as invalidity)
or if the dispute was settled.
Barr Laboratories, a generic drug company, was very
concerned with the Legislature’s proposed adoption of a “but for”
standard of materiality and the requirement that all misconduct be
committed knowingly. 149
Barr maintained that this would
establish a “nearly impossible-to-meet standard for proving a
violation of the duty of candor,” 150 pointing in support of its
assertion to a series of Federal Circuit cases acknowledging that
direct evidence of a knowing intent to deceive rarely exists. 151
Barr further pointed out that the adoption of a “but for” standard
would change at least four recent decisions relating to
pharmaceuticals from a finding of patent unenforceability to a
finding of infringement. 152
145
See Committee Print Hearings, supra note 143, at 13 (statement of J. Jeffrey
Hawley, Legal Division Vice President and Director, Legal Staff, Eastman Kodak Co.).
146
Id.
147
Id. at 24 (statement of Richard J. Lutton, Jr., Chief Patent Counsel, Apple Inc.).
148
Id.
149
Amendment, supra note 143, at 224 (letter to the Honorable Lamar Smith from
Christine J. Siwik on behalf of Barr Laboratories, Inc.).
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 224–25.
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The American Bar Association’s IP Law Section (hereinafter
the “Section”) rallied against any dilution of the “duty of candor
and good faith” standard because the ex parte nature of the patent
application process mandated a strong standard to ensure good
faith dealings between the patent applicant and the examiner. 153
However, the Section, along with the biotech company Genentech,
supported reforms that would affirmatively encourage more
meaningful and valuable disclosures to patent examiners. 154 To
this end, both the Section and Genentech endorsed a legislative
reform proposal that would allow inequitable conduct to be pled
only when a patent claim was found invalid and the alleged
misconduct was causally related to the invalid claim—that is, the
Section and Genentech also supported implementing a “but for”
standard. 155 In support of its position, the Section noted that a “but
for” standard is applied in other types of fraud cases, and that in
such cases, misrepresentations or omissions are only material when
they would affect the outcome of the case. 156 The Section wanted
the same standard applied in inequitable conduct cases, since
misrepresentations or omissions by the patent applicant that do not
affect the outcome of the case, even if reprehensible, do not inflict
harm on the accused infringer because these misrepresentations or
omissions do not change the patentability of the subject matter. 157
The Section also proposed eliminating the “all or nothing” aspect
for a successful holding of inequitable conduct, in which a court
punishes a patentee by finding the whole patent unenforceable—
even if the misconduct only relates to a portion of the claims. 158
Instead, the Section favored assessing a penalty that is in
proportion to the seriousness of the offense, 159 which could reduce
the incentives to raise the defense in borderline cases.
Both the Section and Jon Dudas, the Patent Office’s Director,
noted in the legislative hearings that the current inequitable
153

Committee Print Hearings, supra note 143, at 47 (statement of William L. LaFuze,
Chair, Section of Intellectual Property Law, American Bar Association).
154
Id. at 49.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 86 (attachment IPL Section NRC Response).
158
Id. at 87.
159
Id.
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conduct standard perversely affects the patent application process
by causing patent applicants to over-submit prior art references and
under-disclose the relevance of prior art references. 160 Many
patent applicants submit massive amounts of prior art references in
Information Disclosure Statements (“IDS”) to avoid any later
inequitable conduct allegations that they omitted any material
information, but in so doing bury relevant references among those
having little or no significance. 161 At the same time, patent
applicants avoid making any statements regarding prior art out of
fear that any statements regarding the substance of prior art will
become the basis for a later claim of misrepresentation. 162 In some
cases, patent applicants will avoid searching and/or gaining
knowledge of possible prior art information in a desire to avoid
committing inequitable conduct, however this means the Patent
Office is deprived of possibly relevant prior art. 163 A 2005 review
undertaken by the Patent Office found that over one-half of patent
applications contained either no submitted references or over 20
submitted references. 164 As recognized by the Section and Mr.
Dudas, a doctrine that encourages over-submission and underdisclosure does little to assure the Patent Office’s accurate and
complete review of patent applications and leads only to
inconsistent examination, especially in the fast-paced technology
areas. 165
As a result of the Patent Office’s concerns outlined above, Mr.
Dudas urged Congress to amend the doctrines of inequitable
conduct and unenforceability to ensure that patent applicants are
not discouraged from sharing relevant information with the Patent
Office. 166 To this end, Mr. Dudas suggested that a court’s finding
of intent be wholly separated from a finding of materiality, and that
intent not be found without proof that a patent applicant made a
160

Senate Hearings, supra note 143 (testimony of Honorable Jon W. Dudas Under
Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent
and Trademark Office); Committee Print Hearings, supra note 143, at 48.
161
Senate Hearings, supra note 143; Committee Print Hearings, supra note 143, at 48.
162
Senate Hearings, supra note 143; Committee Print Hearings, supra note 143, at 48.
163
See Senate Hearings, supra note 143.
164
Id.
165
Id.; Committee Print Hearings, supra note 143, at 49.
166
Senate Hearings, supra note 143.
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knowing misrepresentation with intent to deceive. 167 With respect
to defining materiality, Mr. Dudas proposed that Congress limit the
courts to using only the Patent Office’s definition of materiality, as
set forth in its Rule 56 1992 amendment. 168 This last proposal, of
course, signaled the Patent Office’s disapproval of the Federal
Circuit’s decision in Digital Control to not defer to the Patent
Office’s rulemaking authority.
Although, as illustrated above, different industry groups
proposed different types of legislative reform, all shared the
general consensus that patent applicants should have a robust duty
of candor and good faith to increase the quality of patents issued
and many considered the current inequitable conduct standard ripe
for reform due to its inherent uncertainty, perverse barriers to
patent examination, and high litigation costs. 169 The question that
each of these groups struggled with—and came up with different
answers to—was how to encourage patent applicants to be more
forthcoming with the Patent Office, while ensuring an effective
enforcement mechanism for those who engaged in misconduct.
Part IV examines Congress’s ongoing struggle to strike the
appropriate balance between these two objectives.
IV. THE PATENT REFORM ACT
Following the substantial reports by the FTC and the NAS, on
June 8, 2005, Congressman Lamar S. Smith introduced into the
House of Representatives the Patent Reform Act of 2005. 170 This
bill proposed many of the recommendations suggested by the FTC
and NAS, and sought to resolve the dilemma of the inequitable
conduct standard by codifying a duty of candor and good faith 171
and increasing the burden for proving inequitable conduct by
implementing an objective “but for” standard. 172

167
168
169
170
171
172

Id.
Id.
Id.
H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
See id. § 5(a).
See id.
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Most importantly, the 2005 bill eliminated the judicial
equitable conduct defense and granted solely to the Patent Office
the power to investigate inequitable conduct, mandating that courts
defer to the Patent Office’s judgment. 173 To find inequitable
conduct, the Patent Office needed to show, with clear and
convincing evidence, that:
(1) the individual failed to disclose information or
misrepresented information;
(2) the information not disclosed was material or, in
the
case
of
a
misrepresentation,
the
misrepresentation was material;
(3) the individual had knowledge of the materiality
of the information not disclosed or, in the case of a
misrepresentation, of the misrepresentation and
materiality of the misrepresentation; and
(4) the individual had the intent to deceive or
mislead. 174
This standard would have completely overhauled the thenexisting intent element by requiring that the patent applicant have
actual knowledge of the materiality of the information not
disclosed or misrepresented. Also, rather than permitting an
inference of intent, the Patent Office could not make a finding of
inequitable conduct without direct proof of the patent applicant’s
intent to deceive or mislead.
It is vital to note that the 2005 bill would not have even
permitted the alleged infringer to plead inequitable conduct until
one or more claims were found invalid and the alleged infringer
needed to show how the alleged misconduct resulted in an invalid
claim. The bill further restricted the alleged infringer’s pleading of
inequitable conduct by requiring a showing that the alleged fraud
was attributable to the patent owner 175 (that is the patent owner had
engaged in or directed the patent attorney or agent to engage in the
misconduct). While the purpose of this requirement was likely to

173
174
175

See id.
Id.
See id.
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encourage patent agents and attorneys to engage in more
meaningful discourse regarding prior art with the Patent Office, its
practical effect was to essentially eliminate the inequitable conduct
defense, as alleged infringers would find it virtually impossible to
prove that the patent owner was perpetrating the misconduct.
The 2005 bill was never passed into law. Instead, House Bill
1908 was introduced into the House of Representatives the
following year, and an amended version of this bill was ultimately
passed as the Patent Reform Act of 2007 (the “2007 Act”).176
Although numerous aspects of this amended bill mirrored the
proposed 2005 bill, House Bill 1908 proposed a radically different
inequitable conduct standard.
The 2007 Act codified the
inequitable conduct defense and required the patent challenger to
prove inequitable conduct by “clear and convincing evidence” that
material information was misrepresented or omitted with the intent
to mislead or deceive the patent examiner. 177 The Act went on to
provide that information is material if:
(i) a reasonable examiner would have made a prima
facie finding of unpatentability, or maintained a
finding of unpatentability, of one or more of the
patent claims based on the information, and the
information is not cumulative to information
already of record or previously considered by the
Office; or
(ii) information that is otherwise material refutes or
is inconsistent with a position the applicant takes in
opposing a rejection of the claim or in asserting an
argument of patentability. 178
Apart from materiality, the 2007 Act required separate proof of
intent and to prove
specific facts beyond materiality of the information
misrepresented or not disclosed must be proven that
establish the intent of the person to mislead or
deceive the examiner by the actions of the person.
176
177
178

H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007).
Id. § 12(b)(4).
Id.
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Facts support an intent to mislead or deceive if they
show circumstances that indicate conscious or
deliberate behavior on the part of the person to not
disclose material information or to submit false
material information in order to mislead or deceive
the examiner. 179
The materiality component of the 2007 Act is somewhat
similar to the definition set forth in the Patent Office’s Rule 56 and
that the Federal Circuit rejected in Digital Control. 180 However,
the 2007 Act’s proposed materiality standard differs significantly
from Rule 56 in one important regard. By providing that
information is material if a reasonable patent examiner would have
“maintained a finding of unpatentability,” 181 the 2007 Act
broadens Rule 56 to include situations such as when a
misstatement is made in a declaration and the examiner removes
the rejection because of the declaration. In so doing, the 2007 Act
creates a materiality standard that is more akin to the reasonable
examiner standard 182 than to the Rule 56 standard, thereby keeping
the standard relatively in line with current case law precedent.
In sharp contrast, the intent component of the 2007 Act differs
markedly from current judicial precedent. As discussed in detail
above, pursuant to current case law, after threshold levels of
materiality and intent have been shown, a court will balance the
evidence of materiality and intent to determine whether the facts
support a finding of inequitable conduct. 183 By separating intent
from materiality, the 2007 Act would not permit the courts to
engage in any such balancing. Instead, the patent challenger would
need to prove “specific facts beyond materiality of the information
misrepresented or not disclosed” 184 to support a finding of intent.
Such facts would need to show circumstances indicating the
applicant’s conscious or deliberate omission or misrepresentation

179

Id. (emphasis added).
Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
181
H.R. 1908 § 12(b)(4).
182
See infra text accompanying notes 192–201.
183
Baxter Int’l Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
184
H.R. 1908 § 12(b)(4).
180
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of material information, 185 such as an applicant’s disregard for
warnings that material information exists or a cultivation of
ignorance to avoid actual knowledge.
This intent standard would likely lead to different Federal
Circuit case outcomes.
For example, in Novo Nordisk
Pharmaceuticals, 186 the court inferred intent to deceive when a
Dutch inventor wrote in the past tense. 187 Under the 2007 Act’s
proposed intent standard, however, the court could not have found
intent to deceive, as there existed no facts showing the inventor’s
conscious or deliberate attempt to write the final step in the wrong
tense. In this way, then, the proposed intent standard set forth in
the 2007 Act is a more objective determination than the standard
currently utilized by the courts, and is a determination that will
force the courts to find “conscious or deliberate behavior” without
relying on materiality. 188
In another sharp deviation from current judicial precedent, the
2007 Act rejects the Federal Circuit’s current “all or nothing”
remedy of patent unenforceability in the event inequitable conduct
is found, in favor of a number of potential remedies for inequitable
conduct, depending on the particular circumstances of a case.
These remedies include: (1) denying an injunction and allowing
only a reasonable royalty for damages; (2) “[h]olding the claimsin-suit, or the claims involved in the inequitable conduct,
unenforceable[; (3)] [h]olding the patent unenforceable[;] and/or
[(4)] holding the claims of a related patent unenforceable.” 189 A
court’s imposition of a variety of different remedies depending
upon the factual situation presented to it could eliminate some of
the advantages of pleading inequitable conduct, because for
borderline cases of inequitable conduct, the alleged infringer could
prevail on the defense, yet still be liable for infringement and owe
a reasonable royalty to the patentee. In another instance, the court
might hold only the claims that issued due to the misconduct
unenforceable, which leaves other claims of the patent enforceable
185
186
187
188
189

Id.
Novo Nordisk Pharm. Inc. v. Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp., 424 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1359–60.
H.R. 1908 § 12(b)(4) .
Id.
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against the infringer. Although not all or nothing remedies, each
would still serve the equitable function of punishing the patentee
who committed the inequitable conduct and would provide judges
with an arguably easier way of deciding borderline cases and
meting out appropriate punishment.
Important to note is that the pending Senate version of the
Patent Reform Bill, Senate Bill 1145, also has a section addressing
inequitable conduct. 190 The Senate’s version of the bill provides
for nearly identical remedies as does the House of Representative’s
bill, with the only difference being that the Senate version does not
permit a court to hold claims of a related patent unenforceable. 191
The inequitable standard proposed by the Senate’s bill, however,
differs markedly from the standard proposed in the House of
Representative’s bill. Unlike House Bill 1908, Senate Bill 1145
largely codifies the existing judicial inequitable conduct standard.
Under the Senate’s version of the 2007 Act, information is material
if: “(1) a reasonable patent examiner would consider such
information important in deciding whether to allow the patent
application; and (2) such information is not cumulative to
information already of record in the application.” 192 These
materiality requirements are a codification of the reasonable
examiner standard currently employed by the courts coupled with
the judicially oft-used doctrine of not allowing cumulative
information to be considered. 193 Given that the House bill
provides an objective materiality test that is somewhat close in
scope, the final law, if passed, will likely be very similar to the
current House and Senate proposals.
The Senate’s version of the bill also appears to codify the
Kingsdown standard of intent 194 by permitting intent to be inferred
so long as it is “not . . . based solely on the gross negligence of the
patent owner or its representative, or on the materiality of the

190

S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 12 (2007).
Id.; H.R. 1908 § 12(b)(4).
192
S. 1145 § 12.
193
See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1582
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
194
Kingsdown Med. Consultants v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988);
see supra text accompanying note 68.
191
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information misrepresented or not disclosed.” 195 In so doing,
Senate Bill 1145 adopts the Kingsdown standard of intent and
implies a knowledge requirement. Although the Senate’s version
of the bill also separates the materiality determination from the
intent determination, it does not require proof that the
misrepresentation was knowing. 196 In this way, then, the Senate’s
version of the 2007 Act provides a broader test for finding intent
than House Bill 1908, but one that would still likely curtail the
Federal Circuit’s current trend of relaxing the intent standard.
Despite the differences that exist between the Senate and
House of Representatives versions of the 2007 Act, both represent
a radical shift away from the severely narrowed inequitable
conduct standard that was proposed in the 2005 bill. 197 At the
same time, however, both versions of the 2007 Act propose a
variety of remedies intended to punish those who have engaged in
inequitable conduct. 198 By proposing a broader standard along
with a host of potential remedies, it appears that the most recent
versions of the 2007 Act have attempted to strike a compromise
that would remove some of the incentives of over-pleading
inequitable conduct, especially in questionable borderline cases,
without severely narrowing the inequitable conduct standard.
CONCLUSION
As the statistics presented in this article make clear, inequitable
conduct is not a plague upon the courts but, rather, a defense that is
pled in a mere 20% of patent infringement cases. 199 That said, and
as indicated by the fact that courts dismiss inequitable conduct
claims on summary judgment 50% of the time, 200 inequitable
conduct remains an over-pled defense. Such over-pleading, as
discussed earlier, stems from the ease by which an alleged patent

195

S. 1145 § 12.
Cf. id.
197
H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 5(a) (2005).
198
See H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 12(b) (2007); S. 1145 § 12.
199
See supra Table 1. This percentage is only counting those cases that go to trial or
where the issue is decided on summary judgment.
200
See supra Table 2 and corresponding description.
196
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infringer can raise the defense and the immense rewards of
successfully doing so (namely, avoiding a patent infringement
finding). 201
In an effort to curb the number of meritless claims of
inequitable conduct brought by alleged patent infringers, industry
groups and the legislature have spent a great deal of time and effort
proposing ways to reform the inequitable conduct standard. The
ultimate problem with all of the proposals to date, however, is that
they seek to adjust the standard by which inequitable conduct
claims are adjudged instead of removing the incentives of pleading
the defense. In this way, although each of the proposed reforms
may ultimately make it more difficult for an alleged patent
infringer to prevail on an inequitable conduct claim, the alleged
infringer remains free—and it remains in the alleged infringer’s
best interest—to make such a pleading. Perhaps, then, the solution
lies not in modifying the inequitable conduct standard but in
modifying the procedural paradigm in which such claims are
brought. That is, perhaps the simplest and yet most prudent
approach to bringing about needed reform would be to leave the
inequitable standard as it is currently applied by the courts and
simply award attorneys’ fees, in whole or in part, whenever an
alleged patent infringer loses an inequitable conduct summary
judgment motion. Such a legislative provision would significantly
reduce meritless claims of inequitable conduct without mandating
that the courts apply a standard that they did not choose.
Interestingly, existing patent law already provides for the
award of attorneys’ fees in “exceptional cases,” 202 though such
fees are rarely awarded in cases involving inequitable conduct.
Although an inequitable conduct case before the Patent Office
qualifies as an “exceptional case,” 203 a prevailing party must show
an egregious case of misconduct with clear and convincing
evidence to be entitled to attorneys’ fees 204 —a burden that is rarely
met. 205 While district courts have, between 1995 and 2004,
201
202
203
204
205

See supra text accompanying notes 96–101.
35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006).
Id.
Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 125, at 168.
Stevenson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 713 F.2d 705, 712–13 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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awarded attorneys’ fees approximately 40% of the time in
summary judgment decisions against patent holders, no courts
during this time have awarded attorneys’ fees following a
summary judgment decision denying an alleged infringer’s claim
of inequitable conduct. 206 In this way, then, while courts arguably
have the power to curtail frivolous inequitable conduct claims by
imposing attorneys’ fees, they have so far refrained from doing
so, 207 likely because they do not view spurious allegations of
inequitable conduct as “exceptional” cases permitting the award of
attorneys’ fees.
The answer therefore appears to lie in amending Section 285 to
provide that a party claiming inequitable conduct must pay for
opposing counsel’s attorneys’ fees in the event such party’s claim
is dismissed upon a summary judgment motion. Such legislative
reform would remove an alleged patent infringer’s incentive to file
a meritless claim of inequitable conduct. In so doing, the reform
would reduce litigation costs and increase patent quality without
usurping the judiciary’s role and changing the inequitable conduct
doctrine when, in fact, no such change is needed.

206

Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 125, at 168.
See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 831 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding litigation
may merit award of attorney fees); Bayer Aktiengesellschaft v. Duphar Int’l Research
B.V., 738 F.2d 1237, 1242–43 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (awarding fees for a frivolous position
advanced by a party).
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